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Inter-Industry Wage Differences and Theories of Wage Determination
ABSTRACT
Numerous studies have shown large differences inwages for apparently similar
workers across industries. These findirgspose a challenge to standard models
of labor market behavior. A problem withpast studies of industry wage differ-
ences is that they have failed to distinguish between union andnonunion workers.
Many economists may expect union workerswages to be set in a noncompetitive
fashion but would be surprised if nonunionwages were.
We examine the differences inwages across industries for both union and
nonunion workers. We find that even aftercontrolling for a wide range of per-
sonal characteristics and geographic locationlarge wage differences persist for
both union and nonunion workers. Furthermore thepremiums of union and nonunion
workers are highly correlated.We review past studies which demonstrate that
industry wage premiums are also highly correlatedacross countries and have been
very similar over many decades. We present new evidence that thewages of dif-
ferent occupations are highly correlatedacross industries ——thatis if any
occupation in an industry is highly paid all occupationsare. We also review the
evidence which suggests that people whomove from low to high paying industries
receive a large fraction of the industrywage premium and that those who move from
high to low paying industries lose the premium.Finally, we review the evidence
on the correlates of industry wage differences. Quitrates, human capital vari-
ables, capital labor ratios and marketpower measures are all positively corre-
lated with industry wage differencesindividually though the data are not adequate
to determine their independent contributions inmultiple regression.
On the basis of all the evidencewe conclude that standard labor market
clearing models can not easily explain all the facts. Severalalternative models
are discussed including efficiency wage and collectiveaction threat models.
These are found to be more consistent with the facts
though some troubling prob- lems remain.
William T. Dickens Lawrence Katz
Department of Economics Department of Economics
University of California Harvard University
Berkeley, CA 94720 Cambridge, MA 02138I. INTRODUCTION
Large differences in wages across industries exist for seemingly similar work.
Substantial industry wage differentials remain even when union status, standard
individual characteristics, and observed working conditions variables are con-
trolled. Area wage surveys invariably reveal large wage differences for the same
type of work in the same locality. Differences in compensation across estab-
lishments and industries in a local labor market tend to be expanded when employee
benefits are also considered (Dunlop, 1985). The inter-industry wage structure
appears to be extremely stable over time and remarkably similar across industri-
alized economies.
In a recent paper (Dickens and Katz, 1987), we analyze the relative importance
of individual characteristics (standard human capital controls and demographic
characteristics), geographic location, occupation, and industry in explaining
wage differences among private sector workers in the United States. We conclude
from an analysis of covariance that industry affiliation accounts for between
seven and thirty percent of all inter-personal earnings variation for a cross
section of nonunion workers and for between ten and twenty-nine percent for a
cross-section of union workers.1 Industry and occupation combined appear to ac-
count for a greater proportion of earnings variation than do schooling, experi-
ence, and demographic controls.Saunders and Harsden (1981) report similar
results for several Western European economies. The pattern of industry wage
differences presents a challenge to traditional models of the labor market.
A standard competitive labor market model offers several potential explana-
tions for industry wage differentials including differences in labor quality
(skill) and/or the quality of employment.Inter-industry wage differences can
1also reflect transitory differentials related to shifts in labor demand or supply
across sectors and imperfect short-run labor mobility.
In recent years, a number of alternative theories of wage determination (such
as the efficiency wage theories surveyed by Katz (1986), Stiglitz (1986), and
Yellen (1984); the union threat model of Dickens (1986); and the insider-outsider
models of Shaked and Sutton (1984), Solow (1985), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986),
and Lindbeck and Snower(1986)) have been proposed as possible explanations for
industry wage differentials, equilibrium involuntary unemployment, and a wide
variety of other labor market phenomena. These alternative explanations focus
on potential reasons why firms may find it profitable to pay above market clearing
wages and why the importance of these factors may differ across industries. De-
termining the empirical relevance of these alternative models of wage determi-
nation is quite important since the non-competitive models generate positive and
normative implications, with respect to issues such as trade and industrial policy
and unemployment insurance, that can be quite different from textbook competitive
labor market models or implicit contract models.2
Efficiency wage models postulate that the potential benefits to a firm of
higher wages include increased effort and reduced shirking by employees, lower
turnover costs, a higher quality workforce, improved worker morale and better
group work norms. Alternative rationales for the payment of non-competitive wage
premiums relate to the presence union or individual bargaining power, or the
threat of collective action by workers. Firms may find it profitable to pay more
than competitive wages to unionized workers to prevent strikes and maintain in-
dustrial peace. In some situations individuals may be able to bargain for them-
selves some share of the firms earnings beyond their reservation wages.
Industrial relations specialists and institutional economists have long argued
2that nonunion firms often pay higher wages than necessary (to attract a qualified
labor force) for the purpose of avoiding unionization.3
In this paper, we review a wide range of evidence on the magnitude,
intertemporal stability, and structure of industry wage differences. We present
new evidence on the nature and importance of inter-industry wage differentials
for nonunion workers, for different occupations, and on the similarity in the
pattern of these wage differentials across different groups of workers. The
predictions of alternative theories of wage determination for inter-industry wage
differences are analyzed and evaluated against the evidence.
As in past studies, we find large industry wage differences that cannot be
explained by observed human capital, demographic, or locational variables. These
industry differentials persist even when a sample of only nonunion workers is
analyzed. The patterns of industry wage premiums are extremely similar for union
and nonunion workers. We also find that industry wage premiums are highly cor-
related across occupations. In other words, if any workers in any occupation in
an industry are highly paid relative to their observed individual characteristics,
then workers in all occupations in the industry are likely to be. Industry wage
differentials appear to be strongly correlated over long time periods and re-
markably similar across countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II offers a discussion of our
data and presents some basic empirical results on the size and nature of industry
wage differentials for individual occupational groups. Evidence on the relation-
ships of industry wage premiums across occupational groups, time periods, and
countries is presented in section III. The relationship among wages and a wide
range of industry characteristics is reviewed in section IV.
In section V, we discuss standard explanations for industry wage differentials
in a competitive labor market. The evidence on the pattern of industry wages is
3difficult to reconcile with competitive explanations based on compensating dif-
ferentials and/or unmeasured labor quality without significant ad hoc tinkering.
The consistency of alternative models with the evidence on differentials is ana-
lyzed in section VI. No single model appears entirely consistent with all the
evidence on wage differences. Concluding remarks and suggestions for future re-
search are made in section VII.
II.DATA ON INTER-INDUSTRYWAGE DIFFERENCES
We are interested in assessing the relevance of different theories of how wages
are determined in the absence of collective bargaining. For this reason we want
to examine the inter-industry and occupational distribution of wages for nonunion
workers and we are aware of no study which has done this. Hany studies have in-
cluded industry dummies in union and nonunion wage regressions, but none have
analyzed the properties of these dummy variable coefficients nor have they con-
sidered the pattern of industry effects across occupations.
All twelve monthly Current Population Surveys (CPSs) from 1983 were combined
to generate a sample of individuals large enough to accurately estimate the av-
erage wages for detailed industry and occupational categories. Our sample consists
of private sector, nonagricultural, nonunion employees, 16 years of age or older
with complete data on industry and occupation and on either hourly wages or normal
weekly earnings and normal hours of work per week. Average earnings per hour were
computed for each individual with complete earnings data. Observations with re-
ported wages of less than $1.00 per hour or more than $250 an hour were assumed
4to be coding errors and deleted from the data set.4 Although the CPS is partially
a panel data set, only those individuals in outgoing rotation groups are asked
about earnings and people exit the sample only once a year. Thus, we can be sure
that all observations represent unique individuals. This procedure left us with
a sample of 109,735 nonunion workers.
We begin our analysis of industry and occupation wage patterns by analyzing
the differences in wages across three digit 1980 Census of Population code in-
dustries for twelve occupational groups. Table 1 presents basic summary infor-
mation on the extent of industry wage variation by occupation. We utilize the
standard deviation in industry wage differentials to summarize the overall vari-
ability in wages across industries.5 In all twelve occupations, even restricting
attention to nonunion workers, there is substantial variation in the average log
wage across industries. Column 1 presents our estimate of the standard deviation
of the average log wage among industries. It ranges from a high of .46 for sales
workers to a low of .17 for clerical workers. These are large differences by any
account. A one standard deviation difference in the average wage paid to clerical
workers in different industries is about 17% of their average wage. The story is
similar when we weight the industries by their employment in the sample when
computing the standard deviation of the log wages. In this case, we find standard
deviations as large as .37 and as low as .13. Again sales workers show the most
variation and clericals the least.
These large differences would not be a puzzle if they were easily explained
by observable differences in worker characteristics or geographical differences
in labor markets across industries, but they are not. This conclusion follows
from an analysis of industry wage differentials by occupation after controlling
for observable individual characteristics and locational variables. We estimated
industry wage differentials of this type for our 12 occupation and three digit
5Census of Population industry breakdown in two manners. The effects of observed
human capital variables, demographic characteristics, and location were con-
strained to be the same for all occupations in both approaches. The industry wage
effects were allowed to vary by occupation.
The first approach involved the estimation of industry-occupation cell fixed
effects. We postulated an earnings function of the following form:
(1) W..X.. +a. +..
ijk ijk jk ijk
where i indexes individuals, j indexes industries, and k indexes occupations; Wiik
is log(hourly wage) of individual i; Xiik is a vector of individual and locational
variables for individual i, is a vector of parameters, Uk is a fixed effect
(or differential) for industry-occupation cell jk, and ••k is an error term.
This equation is equivalent to a wage equation with industry dummies, occupation
dummies, and a full set of interaction terms between the industry and occupation
dummies. The large number of industry-occupational cells implies that the only
feasible approach to estimating the industry differentials for each occupation
is to first run a de-meaned regression in which the industry-occupation cell means
are subtracted off for the dependent variable and all the independent variables:
(2) W.. -W. =CX..-X. ) + u..
xjk jk ijk jk
where Wik is the mean of the log of hourly earnings for workers in cell jk, Xik
is the the vector of the means of the individual and locational variables for
workers in cell jk, and Ui.k is a regression error. This regression, assuming
that theijk in equation (1) are uncorrelated with the X..k, yields a consistent
6estimate of .Themean residual for each cell j is then a consistent estimate
of the industry-occupation jk fixed effect:
(3) =- X.k.
The estimated fixed effects were then grouped by occupation to analyze the re-
lationships among industry impacts on wages in different occupations
The third column of table 1 presents the weighted standard deviations of
industry fixed effects for each occupation from a log wage regression in which
the most salient individual characteristics have been controlled for as has each
individualts geographic location.The wage differences are smaller than for the
average log wage comparisons, but they are still very large ranging from standard
deviations of .10 for clerical and semi-skilled workers to a standard deviation
of .24 for professionals.
A more conservative approach to assessing the magnitude of industry wage
differentials is to first regress log wages on individual and locational variables
but not on industry-occupation cell dummy variables (fixed effects):
(4) ..=x..+e
ijk ijk ijk
The average residual for each industry-occupation cell provides a measure of in-
dustry wage differentials by occupation. This approach attributes all common
impacts on wages of industry-occupation cell fixed effects and individual and
geographic variables to the individual characteristics and geographic variables.
The corrected standard deviations for the average residual measure of industry
wage differentials for each of our twelve occupations are presented in the fourth
column of Table 1.This approach leads to a further reduction in the standard
7deviations, but the industry differences are still very large. These large wage
differences across industries not accounted for by observed worker character-
istics or labor market location appear to be something of a mystery. In the next
section, we find that the mystery deepens.
III.INDUSTRY WAGE DIFFERENCES ACROSS OCCUPATIONS, TIME AND
COUNTRIES
Thereare many reasons why some workers in one industry might be paid more
than similar workers in another industry. Wage differences may be required be-
cause of differences in the nonpecuniary aspects of jobs or labor quality re-
quirements across industries.For example, blue collar workers in dangerous
industries might receive higher wages to compensate them for the risks they have
to take. Technical workers in another industry may have to have a special skill
for which they are paid a wage premium. Efficiency wage considerations may ne-
cessitate the payment of wage premiums to groups of workers for whom shirking
and/or turnover may be difficult to limit through other mechanisms and costly to
the firm. Working conditions, skill requirements, worker malfeasance and moni-
toring problems, and turnover costs are likely to differ among occupations in a
firm or industry. One thing many explanations for industry wage differentials
have in common is that while they would lead us to expect differences in wages
across industries for individual occupational groups, they would not lead one to
expect the pattern of differentials to be similar for diverse occupations.6 These
explanations provide little reason to expect that an industry which paid its blue
8collar workers more would also pay its secretaries more. However, examining the
correlation of the log of wages of different occupations across industries for
nonunion workers this is exactly what we find.
Table 2 presents the correlations of the average log wages of twelve occu-
pational groups across industries.7 The results are striking. Of the 66 corre-
lations only five take values less than .50 and only 18 are less than .70. The
lowest correlation is .40 (between semi-skilled blue collar workers and sales
workers). The median correlation is .78. Only one pattern is noticeable --the
wages of the more autonomous occupations of sales, technical workers and trans-
portation equipment operators are somewhat less correlated with the wages of other
workers. However, the wages of professionals, who might also be considered highly
autonomous, are highly correlated with the wages of other workers.
One might think that these correlations were the result of workers in the
same industry having similar observed human capital characteristics or to ge-
ographic differences in the labor markets faced by industries. Yet the results
presented in Table 3 suggest this is not the case. Corrected correlations of
industry wage differentials (based on industry-occupation cell fixed effects from
a regression also including controls for individual and locational variables) are
shown in Table 3. Fifty-four of the sixty-six correlations are greater than .7.
The median of .79 is slightly higher than the median for the correlations of the
means for the raw wages. Results are very similar when mean residuals from the
wage equation are used instead of fixed effects. The results indicate that even
after controlling for a wide variety of labor quality and geographic variables
there are large correlations between average wages in any two occupations within
an industry. If one occupational group in an industry is high paid relative to
its observed characteristics, all categories of workers in that industry tend to
be high paid.
9Up to this point, we have been dealing only with nonunion workers. How
similar are the patterns between the union and nonunion sectors? The answer is
that they are very similar. Stacking all the occupations together and correlating
across the two sectors, we find corrected correlation coefficients of .84 forthe
raw data, .83 for the fixed effects, and .79 for the residuals of the wage
equations.8 Thus measures of inter-industry wage differences which ignore the
difference between union and nonunion wage setting are unlikely to yield results
different from studies which focus only on nonunion wages. This is an interesting
and surprising result. Evidently there is not that much difference in the proc-
esses determining union and nonunion wages. We turn now to evidence of the sta-
bility of industry wage patterns over time and in different countries where union
and nonunion workers are treated together.
Two previous studies suggest that the pattern of high correlation of occu-
pational wages within industries may go back many years. Slichter (1950) reports
that for 20 manufacturing industries in 1939 the rank order correlation of average
hourly earnings of male skilled and semiskilled workers and male unskilled workers
was .71. Kumar (1972) finds the correlation of wages of unskilled and skilled
workers across 23 Canadian manufacturing industries in 1966 to be .81.
Industry wage differences for similar workers may reflect transitory dif-
ferentials facilitating the reallocation of labor in response to the shifts in
the sectoral composition of labor demand. If workers are fairly immobile in the
short run, shifts in the fortunes of industries could lead to wage differentials
that are similar for different occupations in an industry. But, many studies have
found a remarkable stability in the pattern of industry wage premiums. This seems
to rule out these transitory differentials as a major component of the explanation
for industry wage differentials.
10Cullen (1956) presents data showing the stability of the wage structure across
manufacturing industries in the U.S. from 1899 to 1950. He finds the rank cor-
relation of average annual earnings for 76 manufacturing industries for the years
1899 and 1950 to be .66. Cullen finds for a group of 84 manufacturing industries
that 14 of the 21 industries in the highest-wage quarter in 1899 were still in
the highest-wage quarter in 1947. Also, 15 of the 21 lowest wage industries in
1899 still in the lowest-wage quarter in 1947. Data on average hourly earnings
for 33 manufacturing industries presented by Kendrick (1961) leads to similar
although not quite as strong conclusions concerning the stability of industry
rankings. Reder (1962) computes the rank correlation for average hourly earnings
in 1899-1909 and 1948-53 from Kendrick's data to be .46.
Furthermore, limited evidence suggests that these persistent differentials
don't just reflect stability in skill mix differences since industry wage dif-
ferences for particular grades of labor also appear to have been fairly stable.
For example, Slichter (1950) finds the rank correlation of male unskilled average
hourly earnings for 20 manufacturing industries between 1923 and 1946 to be .73.
Strong stability in inter-industry wage rankings is also evident for the
postwar United States. Montgomery and Stockton (1985) report that the rank cor-
relation of mean hourly wages for 20 2-digit manufacturing industries between 1951
and 1981 was .675. Bell and Freeman (1985) find strong stability in the rankings
for a group of 53 industries (both manufacturing and non-manufacturing) from 1948
to 1982. Krueger and Summers (l987b) find the correlation of estimated industry
wage premiums between 1974 and 1984 to be .970.
Stability in industry rankings of average wages is also apparent over similar
time periods for Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Canada (OECD, 1965). Lebergott
(1947) finds strong similarities in industry wage structure in the 1940's for
Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Krueger and Summers
11(1987b) find quite high correlations for industry average wages across advanced
industrial economies in the early 1980's, and Pryor (1973) reports concordance
coefficients of .80 within Eastern Block countries, .59 between Western industrial
countries and .67 between the two groups.
IV.CORRELATES OF INDUSTRYWAGE DIFFERENCES
The evidence presented in the last section suggests that there is a pattern
of wage differentials where all workers in some industries are highly paid rela-
tive to similar workers in other industries. The pattern of which industries pay
high wages has been very stable over time and across countries with widely varying
methods of determining labor compensation. What are the attributes of high paying
industries? There exists a large literature relating workers' wages to industry
characteristics. Dickens and Katz (1987) review this literature. Many charac-
teristics have been found to be significantly correlated with wages.Table 4
presents the correlations of average industry wages, union and nonunion industry
wage premiums with a variety of industry characteristics for three-digitCensus
of Population industries circa 1983. The two measures of industry wage differ-
entials (purged of the influence of observable worker variables) are three-digit
industry fixed effects from regressions of log wage on individual characteristics,
11 occupation dummy variables, andstatedummy variables for union and nonunion
workers .
Evenafter controlling for the influence of observed human capital and ge-
ographic variables by using industry fixed effects rather than raw average wages,
12we still find that both union and nonunion wages are strongly correlated with a
wide range of industry characteristics including average workforce character-
istics, firm and establishment size, the capital labor ratio, and several measures
of industry profitability or potential profitability. The industry character-
istics are also strongly related to each other. The industry wage premiums for
both union and nonunion workers are strongly negatively related to quit rates and
strongly positively related to average weekly hours.
It turns out to be problematic to generate more precise information on the
industry factors associated with industry wage premiums than that which is con-
tained in the simple bivariate correlations. The literature on the relation of
industry characteristics and wages provides very mixed evidence on which variables
have significant relations with wages when other variables are included in the
specification. Dickens and Katz (1987) reports experiments with a large number
of specifications, samples, and methods for dealing with missing variables. Our
exploratory analysis and the results of previous studies indicate that the in-
dustry characteristics that are significantly related to wage premiums and the
magnitude of their correlations are quite sensitive to the specification (e.g.
other variables included in the equation) and to the particular sample analyzed
(e.g time period and mix of industries). The implication is that the effects of
industry characteristics are probably not uniform across industries and that
multicollinearity among industry variables makes certain inferences difficult.
A few variables performed nearly consistently in relation to the estimated in-
dustry fixed effects from the 1983 CPS. One workforce characteristic --average
education --hada stable and significant relations to wage premiums.It was
always positively related and nearly always significant. Besides education pro-
fits, when only one of the three measures tried was entered, was always positively
and often significantly related to nonunion industry wage premiums.
13Proportion of workers in large plants or average establishment or firm size
have typically been found to be positively related to industry wage differences
in the presence of detailed controls (Kwoka, 1983; Long and Link, 1983; and Pugel,
1980). But establishment size and firm size appear more important in explaining
wage differentials within industries than across industries. Krueger and Summers
(1987a) find in analyzing the May 1979 CPS that the inclusion of plant size and
firm size controls barley affects the estimates of industry wage differentials.
Oi and Raisian (1985) also find quite large industry wage differentials remaining
after controlling for establishment and firm size with individual data. Brown and
Medoff (1985) conclude a quite detailed study of the impact of plant and firm size
on wages by noting that most of the employer size effect of wages occurs within
detailed (three-digit) industries.
A further issue is whether the relation of industry characteristics to wage
differentials was similar in earlier time periods. Micro data on individual wages
and characteristics as well as much of the industry data used in the previous
analysis are not available for earlier periods.Still, we have been able to
construct a small cross-section data set for manufacturing industries for 1939.
Dickens and Katz (1987) analyze these data which cover 31 manufacturing industries
including most of those employing the largest numbers of workers.
Log average hourly earnings are correlated across industries for skilled and
semiskilled workers and unskilled workers. This confirms Slichter's (1950) rank
correlation results. The partial correlation --controllingfor percent female,
unionization and average age --betweenskilled and unskilled wages is .42.
Both skilled and unskilled wages are positively correlated with extent of
unionization in an industry.Since Slichter's (1950) data indicate that the
relative wage structure in 1929 in these industries was quite similar to that in
1939 (rank correlation of .89) and since Lewis's (1963) estimates of industry
14unionization in 1929 indicate quite little unionization in almost all of these
industries at that time, this correlation indicates that pre-union high wage in-
dustries tended to be the ones that were subsequently heavily unionized.
A significant positive correlation is apparent between average hourly
earnings for both unskilled and skilled and semiskilled workers with net income
after taxes as a percentage of sales.This indicates that more profitable in-
dustries tended to pay higher wages at this date. Finally, the common finding
in post-war data of a negative relation between quit rates and wages is replicated
here.
V.STANDARD EXPLANATIONS FOR INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE DIFFERENCES
Industry wage differences in a textbook competitive labor market canarise
fromdifferences in worker ability, compensating differentials for non-pecuniary
aspects of work that directly affect worker utility, and/or transitory wage dif-
ferentials arising in the process of adjustment to sectoral shifts.
Labor Quality Differences in production technologies across industries mean
that employers in certain industries may find it profitable to hire higher quality
workers (and hence pay higher wages) than those in other industries or to hire
workers with valuable skills This explanation implies that equally productive
workers are paid the same in different industries, and that industry wage dif-
ferences reflect differences in labor quality. Although observed labor quality
measures are found to explain a part of industry wage differences, our results
15and the findings of previous studies show that large, statistically significant
wage effects remain after controlling for a wide variety of individual charac-
teristics. Our results also show that the size of industry wage effects is not
much altered if wage equations are first estimated without industry dummy vari-
ables and the residuals are used to compute industry differentials. This approach
credits observed quality variables with all the impact of unobserved variables
that are correlated with both the measured quality variables and with industry
status. If unmeasured labor quality is correlated with measured worker charac-
teristics, then it cannot provide an explanation for the large remaining industri
effects.
The high correlation of industry wage differences across occupations is also
problematic for this view. Technology may explain why one type of worker in an
industry would have to have some special skill which we do not observe. However
it is much more difficult to explain why all occupations in such industries must
10
be highly paid.
Longitudinal data provides a potential control for time invariant, unmeasured
labor quality.If high wage industries simply have high quality workers and if
workers of a given quality are paid equally in different industries, wage changes
should not be systematically linked to changes in industry status. Longitudinal
data allow one to examine the wages of a given individual as he or she switches
industries. First difference (or fixed-effects) estimation allows one to elimi-
nate the impacts of unchanging labor quality (that is rewarded equally in all
industries) on the industry wage effects estimates.
Krueger and Summers (1987a) estimate large effects of industry switches (for
broadly defined industries) on wages in first differenced regressions utilizing
matched CPS data for 1974-75, 1977-78, and 1979-80. The estimated industry ef-
fects from the first difference regression are similar in direction andmagnitude
16to pooled regression estimates. However, Krueger and Summers use CPS data in
which it is believed that a substantial fraction of workers misreport their in-
dustry (Mellow and Sider, 1983). They construct a correction factor to adjust
for this problem utilizing data from Mellow and Sider on the chance of spurious
classification of an individual between any given pair of one-digit industries.
This approach relies on the questionable assumption that the probability of making
an error is not correlated across years.Relaxing this assumption assumption
would probably lead to lower estimated industry wage effects for industry
switchers. On the other hand, Krueger and Summers base their correction on data
on discrepancies between employer and employee reports of industry classifica-
tion. To construct the correction factor they must make an assumption about how
often each is wrong about the classification. Their prefered correction assumes
that when workers and employers disagree about which industry the worker is in
they are each wrong half the time. In fact we would expect that employers probably
have a better idea of which industry workers are in than workers do. Since Krueger
and Summers use workers' reports of industry affiliation there are probably more
misclassifications in the data Krueger and Summers use than they are assuming
there are so their correction may not be adaquate and their estimates may instead
be downward biased. Without information on the size of these two effects it is
impossible to say which is more important. Experiments with alternative measure-
ment error corrections by Krueger and Summers suggest that longitudinal estimates
of industry wage effects are fairly sensitive to changes in assumptions about the
extent of measurement error.
Murphy and Topel (1987) analyze industry-occupation wage differences. They
also use the CPS but have a different means of correcting for misreporting of
industry and occupation.They find that industry-occupation wage differences
estimated for changers are less than half the size of those estimated in the cross
17section. Krueger and Summers' uncorrected estimates of the industry effects for
job changers are about the same magnitude and are almost certainly biased downward
by the errors in reporting. The disparity is probably a result of Murphy and Topel
confounding the effects of occupation changes and industry changes.It seems
reasonable that those being promoted to higher paying occupations move from rel-
atively high paying jobs in the occupations that they are leaving to relatively
low paying jobs in the occupation they are joining. Thus their wages would not
be expected to go up by the full difference between the average wages of the two
occupations.
Vroman (1978) analyzes the pattern of earnings changes for industry switchers
in the 1964-71 period. He uses a large sample drawn from the social security
continuous wage history data base.11 This data set has relatively reliable in-
dustry classifications for all workers. Unfortunately Vroman only reports the
earnings changes of those leaving or entering the durable goods manufacturing and
retail trade sectors. He does not discriminate between where they are coming from
or going to.Still he finds that those who enter the high wage durable goods
industry or leave the low wage retail trade industry experience substantial
earnings increases of 20-60% depending on the time period.
The longitudinal evidence does run counter to the view that workers of a given
quality are paid equally in different industries. It thus casts doubt on the
compound hypothesis that high wage industries are those that employ proportion-
ately more unobservably high ability workers and that these workers receive the
same wage wherever they work. Yet industry switchers are not a random sample of
workers and these first differenced estimates are likely to suffer from important
selectivity bias. There are, however, explanations of inter-industry wage dif-
ferences based on time-invariant, unmeasured labor quality in which workers of a
given ability are paid differently in different industries, and ability is
18imperfectly observed by labor market participants. Gibbons and Katz (1987) de-
velop a model in which industry technologies differ in their ability sensitivity
and only a noisy ex-ante ability signal is available to labor market participants
at the time of initial hiring. Subsequent productivity observations provide more
information about worker ability. The noisy ex-ante signal and the ex-post pro-
ductivity observations result in imperfect matching of workers to industries ex-
ante and improved matching ex-post. High ability workers gravitate towards with
ability sensitive industries and low ability workers get weeded with increased
labor market experience. This sorting model explains inter-intdustry wage dif-
ferences as returns to ability, and interprets inter-industry mobility as im-
proving the allocation of workers to industries as new information becomes
available.Certain matching models, which are essentially unmeasured labor
quality models, in which worker attributes have different value in different
matches (industries) are also potentially consistent with the longitudinal
results.'2 But sorting and matching models require substantial ad hoc tinkering
to explain why all occupations appear to benefit from good matches in the same
industries and why ability-sensitivity and industry rents are positively corre-
lated.
Compensating Differentials A second possible competitive explanation is that
the industry wage differentials reflect compensating differentials for nonwage
job attributes that directly affect the utility ofworkers.'3 This is often the
justification for including industry dummies in wage equations estimated with
individual cross-section data. The relationships among industry variables and
wage differentials presented in section IV and the findings of Rosen (1969) in-
dicate that differences in average weekly hours may provide a labor supply channel
to help explain industry wage differences. Yet Krueger and Summers (1987a) find
19that the inclusion of 10 working conditions variables, including weekly hours,
in a standard wage equation barely affects the estimated industry wage premiums.14
Freeman (1981) and Krueger and Summers (1987a) find that differences in fringe
benefits enlarge rather than offset wage differentials. Many important
nonpecuniary job attributes are unlikely to be captured by these control vari-
ables.
If industry wage premiums reflect equalizing differences, then they do not
reflect rents that make jobs especially valuable to workers. The implication is
that there is no reason to expect industry wage premiums to be systematically
related to quit rates. Industry and individual level studies both indicate that
wage premiums are strongly associated with lower quit rates (Ulman (1965),
Pencavel (1970), Freeman (1980), Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers
(1987a)). This suggests that industry wage premiums reflect rents to good jobs
or good matches and are not merely compensatingdifferences.15
Industry wage differences could potentially arise from differences in pat-
terns of human capital accumulation across industries. This does not appear to
be the case. Krueger and Summers (1987a) find that industry wage differentials
are approximately equal in magnitude and highly correlated for young (20 to 35
years old) and older (50 to 65 years old) workers. Further, the 1979 Current
Population Survey contains information on job tenure (years with current em-
ployer). We utilized this data to determine if industry wage differences vary
with job tenure. Estimates of log wage equations for separate tenure groups for
nonunion, private sector workers indicated that the industry differentials are
quite similar in magnitude and have a strong positive correlation. For example,
the correlation for nine one-digit-industry dummy variables between the equations
for those with less than one year of tenure and those with ten or more years is
.91.When we pool tenure groups and estimate both intercept and slope coeff i-
20cients for all one digit industries we find a negative correlation between the
slopes and the intercepts of.33. But, when the tenure profiles are plotted very
few cross. For the most part, high paying industries are high paying for workers
of all ages and lengths of service.
VI. ALTERNATIVEEXPLANATIONS FOR INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE
DIFFERENTIALS
A. EFFICIENCY WAGE EXPLANATIONS
Thebasic efficiency wage hypothesis states that the productivity of workers
is a function of the wage paid by the firm. In this case, firms may not cut wages
in the presence of excess supply of labor, since reducing wages can potentially
increase labor costs.Equilibrium can be consistent with non-market clearing
wages, job rationing, and even involuntary unemployment in some models.If ef-
ficiency wage considerations are important in some sectors and not as relevant
in others, segmented (dual) labor markets of the type describe by Doeringer and
Piore (1971) can arise)6
A number of conceptually distinct, although possibly complimentary, eff i-
ciency wage models may provide rationales for the payment of above market clearing
wages. We describe the mechanisms of the four most relevant models brieflyhere.
21The variant of the efficiency wage model that has drawn the most attention
recently is the shirking model. Employers typically have only imperfect infor-
mation concerning the behavior of workers on the job. The supervision and moni-
toring of worker actions is costly.The punishments for substandard employee
performance available to a firm are typically limited by legal constraints and
social custom. Under these conditions, employers must find mechanisms to elicit
adequate effort from their employees.Piece rates and other direct pay-for-
performance compensation schemes are often impracticable.Firms may find it
profitable in this situation to raise wages above the opportunity costs of work-
ers. By increasing wages, firms raise the cost of job loss and encourage workers
to put forth adequate effort. When workers are paid wages above their opportunity
costs, they value their jobs, and the threat of termination for detected loafing
creates an incentive for workers not to shirk.
A second model of efficiency wages postulates that they are paid in order
to minimize turnover costs. If firms must bear part of the costs of turnover and
if quit rates are a decreasing function of wages paid, firms have an incentive
to pay high wages to reduce costly turnover.
Imperfect information by firms about the abilities of workers may provide a
selection rationale for efficiency wage payments.If workers are heterogeneous
in ability and if ability and reservation wages are positively correlated, firms
which offer higher wages will attract higher quality job applicants. If firms
cannot observe applicant quality and lack devices to induce workers to reveal
their true abilities, random hiring from the applicant pool must be utilized. A
higher wage increases the expected ability of a worker hired randomly from the
applicant pool. A wage above the market clearing level may minimize costs per
efficiency unit of labor under these circumstances (Weiss, 1980). Institutional,
legal, or sociological constraints preventing firms from differentiating wages
22across workers with different productive characteristics can lead to similar re-
sults.
A final group of efficiency wage models are based on sociological consider-
ations. Workers' effort levels may depend on the extent to which they feel they
are being treated fairly by their employers. The perceived justness of the wage
may affect worker productivity if effort levels are linked to worker morale and
feelings of loyalty to the firm.Solow (1979) and Akerlof (1982) develop such
models. Wages in excess of market clearing may be the outcome when wages play a
dual role of both allocating labor across firms and of satisfying interpersonal
and intertemporal wage norms that may affect worker performance.
A basic implication of efficiency wage models is that if the conditions ne-
cessitating efficiency wage payments differ across industries, then the optimal
wage will differ among industries. This means that workers with identical pro-
ductive characteristics are paid differently depending on their industry aff ii-
lation. These wage differences for similar workers may reflect industry
characteristics that do not directly affect the utility of workers and thus would
not require compensating differentials in a standard competitive labor market.
Each variant of the efficiency wage hypothesis predicts that particular in-
dustry and firm characteristics should be associated with industry wage premiums.
The shirking model leads to the prediction that wages should be high where moni-
toring is difficult and/or costly and where the cost of workers not performing
up to performance standards is high.Oi (1983) suggests that higher wages are
required in large establishments since monitoring is typically more difficult.
The cost of foul ups is likely to be large in industries with expensive equipment
(possibly proxied by high capital/labor ratios) and for workers in positions where
poor performance may affect many other workers' performance (integrated pro-
duction processes). The turnover model implies that wage premiums should arise
23where turnover and training costs are large and that wage premiums should yield
the benefit of lower quit rates. The adverse selection model predicts higher
wages, after controlling for observables, where it is difficult to evaluate labor
quality. The sociological models are less specific but suggest that the impor-
tance of teamwork and ability-to-pay may be relevant.
All the models are superficially consistent with the observed patterns of
industry wage differences. In fact, their ability to explain industry wage dif-
ferences is a major reason why they have generated so much interest. These the-
ories are also consistent with the evidence presented by Dickens and Lang
(1985a,b,1986&l987) that indicates that wage distributions are better character-
ized by a pair of wage equations consistent with the dual labor market model than
by a single human capital wage function. Dickens and Lang also find that primary
sector jobs appear to be rationed as efficiency wage theory would predict.
Efficiency wage models are based on the argument that firms pay above market
clearing wages because of the productivity augmenting benefits of doing so.
Little empirical evidence is available on the benefits to firms of the payment
17 . . . . ofwage premiums.The evidence discussed previously indicates that positive wage
differentials are associated with lower quit rates. High wages appear to help
reduce turnover costs. Nuch more research is required analyzing the costs and
benefits of wage differentials.
One potential inconsistency with the evidence of these models is that, with
the exception of the sociological theories, none of the models would lead one to
expect the large positive correlations we find between the wage premiums of dif-
ferent occupations in the same industry. For example, secretarial jobs are vir-
tually identical in many industries, but secretaries are highly paid in highly
paid industries and less well paid in others. There is little in the economic
24efficiency wage models that would lead one to expect this although some explana-
tions have been proposed.
One possibility (Weiss 1966) is that managers in more profitable industries
may be constrained by fear of anti-trust from making too high a profit for
stockholders. This may lead them to use their industryts market power to purchase
amenities for themselves. Heywood (1985) shows that a positive relation between
wages and product market power arises from a simple model of expense-preference
behavior by managers in a labor market where efficiency wages are paid. By paying
their workers more they can spend less time monitoring them and still maintain
the same level of productivity.
Alternatively, if workers are heterogeneous with respect to their propensity
to shirk, the efficiency wage premium will depend on the cost to the company of
worker shirking and not just the value to the worker and the probability of de-
tection. Then if individual workers do not substitute completely for each other
in the production of the firms product or in the use of some capital equipment,the
efficiency wage premium will be proportional to the lost output or the cost of
the under utilized capital)8 If all occupations receive efficiency wages then
this can lead to the cross occupation correlations. Thus it is conceivable but
not probable that the shirking efficiency wage model can explain this phenomena
since it seems unlikely that it would be necessary to pay all workers efficiency
wages or that the substitutability condition would be met for all occupations.
More theoretical work and empirical evidence is necessary to clarify this point.
The one class of efficiency wage models which seems to be most consistent
with the existence of industry differences, the correlation of these differences
between occupations, and the correlation of the industry differences with profits
and concentration ratios is the class of sociological or normative models of ef-
ficiency wages. Workers may feel that an employer who is earning greater profits
25should pay workers more. Such norms would affect the wages of all workers in an
industry.
The normative model is also consistent with the evidence on the inter-temporal
stability of industry wage premiums to the extent that industry profitability is
stable over time. The little evidence we have suggests that it is at least on
average over long periods of time. Furthermore, sociological models suggest that
once wage differentials are established they may become customary with workers
attaching normative significance to their maintenance (Piore, 1973). This is an
additional argument why these considerations may lead to stable differentials
which are only altered in periods of great economic distress. The analysis of
events surrounding major changes in industry wage patterns is also an important
avenue for future research.
The downside to the normative models is the cross-national evidence, par-
ticularly the finding of such a great degree of similarity between wage setting
in Eastern block and Western developed countries.Presumably ability to pay
should not be similar to that in Western nations nor should it matter for wage
setting in centrally planned economies. The international evidence would seem
to suggest a technological foundation for the wage patterns. The evidence on the
correlation of wages within industries argues against such an interpretation.
One possible reconciliation is to suggest that both economic and sociological
efficiency wage models are relevant. Blue collar wages may be influenced by a
desire to prevent shirking or reduce turnover. Norms may require that managers
are paid more than supervisors and supervisors more than skilled workers.
Finally, administrative support staff may feel that fairness requires that they
be paid in relation to the earnings of those they work for. Economics may explain
the differences between industries and normative considerations the patterns
within industries.
26This is not an elegant explanation for the patterns we observe. It begs the
question why workers would adopt such norms and withhold effort if they were not
satisfied. However, an inelegant explanation is not necessarily an incorrect one.
B.COLLECTIVE ACTION THREAT AND BARGAINING MODELS
Workersmay be able to raise their wages above competitive levels through
collective action and the threat of a strike or work slowdown. Much research
effort has gone into documenting the non-competitive wage premiums earned by union
workers. Freeman and Medoff (1984) summarize much of the empirical research in
this area..
The model of Dickens (1986) shows that nonunion workers, even those employed
in competitive industries, may benefit from the threat of collective action. Such
premiums are most likely to arise where the costs of collective action to workers
are low, where workers are most favorably disposed toward collective action, and
where the firm has rents derived from market power or has large fixed capital
investments. When collective action manifests itself in the formation of unions,
union/nonunion wage differences will be largest where costs to forming unions are
high and workers are least favorable to unionization. Also changes over time in
these factors should be correlated with changes in the union/nonunion wage dif-
ference. Differences in industry wage premiums across occupations with important
union threats (blue collar occupations) and those with smaller threats or no
possibility of unionization (managers and professional workers) may provide fur-
27ther information on the importance of union-based models. The international ev-
idence on industry wage patterns can also be brought to bear.
The evidence presented on the correlates of industry wage premiums is cer-
tainly consistent with the union threat explanation as is the correlation between
union and nonunion wage patterns. The across industry correlation of nonunion
wages with union density may also be evidence of a union threat effect. As noted
earlier the pattern of which industries pay high wages predates the large increase
in unionism in the 1930s, but the pattern could have reflected the presence of a
threat even in the absence of an established union movement.Mathewson in his
1931 book Restriction of Output among Unorganized Workers, and Roy in his intro-
duction to the 1969 edition of Mathewson, report on numerous examples of workers
acting in concert to obtain concessions from employers in the absence of unions.
Even the international evidence may be compatible with this explanation. At first
blush it may seem unreasonable to talk about a union threat in the Soviet Union.
But, if we think in the more general terms of worker collective action the ex-
planation seems more plausible. There are labor disputes even in the Soviet Un-
ion. Goldman (1983, plo8-112) reports on a number of major work stoppages and
even the formation of unauthorized trade unions. Given the political climate in
the Soviet Union such actions are undoubtedly only the tip of the iceberg. Less
visible small scale work actions and sabotage are probably more common. Still,
it is unclear why the amount of rent workers could extract from different indus-
tries would have so similar a pattern in the East and the West even if there is
a threat of collective action in the East unless it is related only to the tech-
nology and not to product market conditions. This objection also applies to the
class of implicit bargaining or "indsider-outsidert' models (Shaked and Sutton
1984, Lindbeck and Snower 1984, Solow 1985 and Rotemberg and Saloner 1986) To the
28extent they can explain the cross occupational correlations they have difficulty
explaining the cross national correlations.
Krueger and Summers (l987a) argue against the union threat explanation for
industry wage patterns on the basis of their finding of a high correlation between
industry wage patterns in the North and South. While union density is lower in
the South, employers there cannot ignore the possibility of unions forming.
Nothing in the threat model would lead us to expect that wages in the North and
South would not be correlated. What the model would lead us to anticipate is that,
if union density is lower in the South or Right-to-Work states because workerS
are less interested in unions or because it is more costly to form unions, the
union/nonunion wage differential should be larger there.This is what Farber
(1984) finds for Right-to-Work states and Freeman and Medoff (1984) find for
southern states.
The changes in the union/nonunion wage gap in the l930s and the 1970s are
also consistent with the union threat model. It is often argued that the passage
of the NLRA reduced the costs to workers of organizing unions. If that is so then
we would expect to see a reduction in the union wage premium in the period fol-
lowing the NLRA. In the 1970s union density has been declining rapidly and many
have attributed this to increased employer resistance to unions or a growing
dissatisfaction with unions on the part of workers. Either of these trends could
be expected to widen the union/nonunion wage gap if at least some nonunion wages
are set to prevent unionization.The empirical evidence from both periods is
consistent with this hypothesis (see Johnson (1981)). Of course this evidence
would also be consistent with a competitive model of wage determination for the
nonunion sector if high costs or more difficult organizing made unions more Se-
lective so that they only attempted to organize workplaces where larger wage gains
were possible.
29A final problem fitting the union threat explanation to the data is that such
an explanation for industry wage patterns would not lead us to expect that the
wages of managerial workers would be correlated with those of other workers since
collective action by managers is not protected by U.S. labor law and is rarely
if ever observed. It could be that managers in high wage industries must be higher
paid to allow firms to promote from within. Alternatively the threat of collec-
tive action may be determining the wages of blue collar workers while wage norms
mandate a relation between those wages and the wages paid managers.
VII. CONCLUSION.
Our study of the nature of industry wage patterns suggests several conclu-
sions. The most compelling is that there appear to be large, persistent wage
differentials that cannot be adequately explained by standard competitive labor
market models. It seems unlikely that the large differences in wages between
industries largely reflect differences in labor quality or compensating differ-
entials for unseen job characteristics. Still sorting models where information
about ability is revealed gradually with work experience may play some role in
explaining wage differences and the pattern of inter-industry mobility.The
correlation of wages and quit rates makes it unlikely that wage differences re-
flect differences in job quality. These explanations are also hard to reconcile
with the observed correlations of industry wage differentials across occupations,
the similarity of union and nonunion wages and with the positive relationship
30between wages and ability to pay. The evidence taken together suggests to us that
it will be productive to pursue other explanations.
While some of the other explanations we consider can explain observed patterns
of wage differentials, none are entirely consistent with all aspects of the data.
Economic efficiency wage models can explain the existence of industry differences
but are difficult to reconcile with the finding of wage correlations across oc-
cupations within industries. Normative or Sociological efficiency wage models
are consistent with the intra-industry correlations but are difficult to reconcile
with the cross-national evidence.A combination of the two models provides a
consistent though inelegant account of the facts.
The threat of collective action by workers is also consistent with most of
the facts with two notable exceptions. The collective action threat model cannot
explain why managerst wages should be correlated with those of other workers and
is hard to reconcile with the high correlation of industry wage patterns between
the East andtheWest. But the fact that it can account for so much of what we
know about changes in union/nonunion wage differences as well as the anecdotal
evidence on the importance of such considerations in wage setting in large non-
union firms suggests that it is probably an important determinant of wages in the
U.S. even if it is not the most important.
The consistency of industry wage patterns over time is one of the most in-
teresting puzzles and provides one of the best opportunities for future research.
One way of testing alternative theories is to see if they can help explain why
those industries which changed relative position did so.Such research is of
great importance given the differences in the policy implications of alternative
theories.
31FOOTNOTES
1.These wide ranges arise from the substantial collinearity between industry
status and individual characteristics.
2. Bulow and Summers (1986), Dickens (1986), and Stiglitz (1986) provide detailed
discussions of the policy implications of alternative wage determination models.
3.Foulkes (1980) presents numerous examples of large nonunion firms which
maintain high wages at least partially to avoid unionization. Freeman and Medoff
(1984, chapter 10) discuss the impacts of unions on nonorganized labor in the
United States.
4. Most of the specifications presented have also been estimated with these
outliers left in the data. The removal of these observations does not affect the
qualitative nature of the results in any of the cases examined.
5. These estimates have been corrected to take into account the measurement
(sampling) error in the means of the industry-occupation average log wages. Ap-
pendix 1 describes the correction for both the weighted and unweighted estimates.
6. A detailed discussion of the implications of alternative theories for the re-
lationships among occupations in the pattern of industry wage differentials is
deferred to sections V and VI. Transitory wage differentials arising from shifts
in labor demand across sectors are likely to be common across occupations in an
industry.
7. These correlations have been corrected for sampling error in the means of the
industry-occupation cell average log wages. See appendix 1 for a description of
the method used. Mellow and Sider (1983) show that as many as twenty percent of
workers' one-digit occupations may not be correctly classified. This may lead
to an upward bias in the estimated correlations across occupations. However, the
extremely high correlations of even very distinct occupations leads us to believe
that the effect is probably unimportant.
8. These correlations involve a mixture of industry and occupation wage differ-
entials. We also estimated separate regressions for the union and nonunion samples
with our usual set of control variables as well as 11 occupation dummies and three
digit Census of Population industry dummies. The corrected correlation of these
industry fixed effects for union and nonunion workers is .83. Our combined 1983
CPS private sector, union sample contains 25193 observations.
9. See Dickens and Katz (1987) for a more complete description of the data and
procedures utilized in estimating the correlations in Table 4.
10. Oi (1983) develops a model with heterogeneous entrepreneurs in which the more
talented entrepreneurs conserve on monitoring costs by hiring higher quality
workers at all levels in the hierarchy. This model is a combination of an eff i-
Footnotes 32ciency wage and a labor quality story for wage differentials. Still, 01's model
implies that better entrepreneurs also operate larger firms. The small impact of
the inclusion of controls for establishment and firm size on industry wage dif-
ferentials (Krueger and Summers, 1987a) suggests that unobserved labor quality
arising through this channel is not a primary factor In explaining industry wage
differences for observationally equivalent workers.
11. Since Vroman's results refer to changes in annual earnings rather than in wage
rates. It is possible that systematic changes in hours worked across industries
rather than hourly earnings changes contribute to his findings.
12.The longitudinal results (industry switch effects) of Krueger and Summers
(1987a) and Vroman (1978) are potentially consistent with models in which worker
quality is heterogeneous (multidimensional) and match quality varies.Gibbons
and Katz (1987) discuss in detail the large number of seemingly "unverifiable"
assumptions about unobservables and information necessary to make a model, in
which industry wage differences reflect ability, consistent with the basic styl-
ized facts.
13. Rosen (1986) provides a comprehensive treatment of the theory of equalizing
differences in the labor market and a survey of empirical studies of compensating
differentials.
14. The working conditions variables included as controls by Krueger and Summers
are weekly hours, commute time, workshift dummies, variables indicating dangerous
or unhealthy conditions on the job, dummies indicating extent of choice of over-
time, and variables indicating whether working conditions are pleasant. Krueger
and Summers perform this analysis on a sample derived from the 1977 Quality of
Employment Survey.
15. This interpretation is clean if workers have homogenous tastes concerning
nonpecuniary aspects of work.If workers have heterogeneous preferences, then
it is possible to imagine distributions of worker preferences with respect to
nonwage aspects of work in which wage differentials that reflect compensating wage
differentials for marginal workers may be negatively correlated with average quit
rates in an industry. This means that quit rates do not depend on wage differences
for marginal workers but do for infra-marginal workers. A particular contrived
example is the case of one disamenity that some workers mind and others do not
mind.If enough workers care about the disamenity, a compensating differential
may arise to compensate the marginal worker for this disamenity.Workers who
don't care about the disamenity take jobs at the high wage firms with the disa-
menity and earn rents. These workers have lower quit rates and reduce the average
quit rate in high wage firms.Low wage firms without the disamenity have no
workers earning rents.In this example, more infra-marginal workers are at the
high wage firm and average quit rates are negatively correlated with wages. One
could also construct examples going in the other direction. Thus, if workers have
heterogeneous preferences, the relationship among quit rate and wage differen-
tials may be difficult to relate to the importance of equalizing differences in
the labor market.
16. Bulow and Summers (1986) develop a formal model in which dual labor markets
arise from efficiency wage considerations.
Footnotes 3317. Recent papers by Krueger (1986), Leonard (1987), and Levine (1987) attempt
to directly analyze the wage-productivity relationship postulated by efficiency
wage theories.
18. To see what is meant by this consider two alternative production processes.
In one each worker is provided with his or her own machine. If any worker shirks
the firm's loss is proportional to the value of the machine the worker is using.
With unobservable heterogeneity of workers the wage the firm pays will depend on
the value of the machine.If instead, a large number of workers use a common
machine and workers who shirk do not get in the way of those who don't then the
firm will simply hire enough workers so that it can count on having as many as
it needs to accomplish the work. The firm can trade off between higher wages or
more workers, but the value of the capital and/or the output being produced will
not be a consideration. The occupational correlations can be explained if indi-
vidual workers in one occupation are imperfect substitutes for the individual
workers of another occupation, or if they work with common capital equipment (for
example an assembly line). Note from the above examples that it is not sufficient
for the groups to be imperfect substitutes (as in a standard production function)
if the groups are sufficiently large since again the firm could simply hire enough
workers to guarantee that the desired amount of work got done.
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TABLE 1
STANDARD DEVIATION OF AVERAGE LOG WAGE ACROSS INDUSTRIES
RawData Wage Equation Wage Equation
UnweightedWeighted Fixed-Effects2Residuals3
Occupations1
Managers .23 .24 .17 .13
Professionals .27 .30 .20 .22
Technicians .21 .19 .13 .09
Supervisors .24 .26 .18 .16
Sales .46 .37 .29 .14
Clerical .17 .13 .14 .09
Service .29 .19 .18 .11
Crafts .20 .15 .16 .10
Operatives .22 .21 .17 .11
Semi-Skilled .20 .15 .14 .08
Trans. Equip. Oper. .17 .16 .15 .13
Laborers .22 .15 .15 .09
1. Definitions of occupational categories can be found in
Appendix 2.
2. These are unweighted standard deviations. The wage regressions
contained dummy variables for state, smsa, marital status, sex, race,
and part-time work. Education (years of schooling), education squared,
experience (age-education-5) and experience squared were included
as continuous variables. Experience and experience squared were
also interacted with all the other variables except for the
state and smsa dummies and education squared.
3. These are weighted standard deviations. The wage regressions
contained dummy variables for state, marital status, sex, race,
Tables 39part-time work and whether or not the individual lives in an
SNSA. Education (years of schooling), education squared,
experience (age-education-5) and experience squared were included
as continuous variables. Experience and experience squared were
also interacted with all the other variables except for the













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































SAMPLING ERROR CORRECTION FOR STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND CORRE-
LATIONS
Weencounter a problem in estimating both the standard deviations of the
industry—occupation wage effects and the correlations of the industry wage effects
across occupations. The problem is that whether we are using cell means or dummy
variable estimates we only have a sample of all people in the cell and our esti-
mates are subject to sampling error. This biases estimated standard deviations
up and correlations down. -Since the magnitude of the bias can be estimated we
are able to construct correction factors which yield consistent estimates of the
across industry standard deviations and correlation coefficients.
The industry—occupation cell mean or estimated fixed effect for industry i and
occupation j (mn) can be written
(Al) m1 =
wherem' is the true cell mean or fixed effect and is the sampling error
of the estimate. Thus the variance of the estimated means across all industries
for occupation i is
(A2) Var(m) =Var(m')
+Var(e).
To obtain an unbiased estimate of the across industry variance of the true in-












where is the average wage for everyone in occupation j, n1, is the number of
observations in industry—occupation cell ii, N is the number of people in all
industries in occupation j, and lWijk is the log of the hourly wage for person k
in industry i and occupation j.
Computing the correlations of the ms yields a biased estimate of the correlations
of the m's. This is because cov(m,mk)cov(m'm'k) but as noted above, the
variances in the denominator of the correlation coefficient of the ms are biased
upward so the estimated correlation is biased downward. This problem is solved
by using the consistent variance estimates from A3 in constructing the corre-
lations.
The problem becomes more involved when we wish to correct the variances and the
correlations of the industry—occupacion fixed effects. This can be easily done
using the variance—covariance matrix of the regression from which the fixed ef—
Appendix 1 A1—2fects were derived, but since the fixed effects estimates are obtained using a
two—step procedure we must construct the estimated variance—covariance matrix as
—1 —1 —1 —1
(A6) Var(m) =a[(X'X) +(X'X) X'Z(Z'PZ) Z'X(X'X) ]
wherem is the vector of industry and occupation fixed effects, a is the estimated
standard error of the regression with the fixed effects, X is the matrix of fixed
effect dummy variables, Z is the matrix of covariates, and PX(X'X)1X'.
Is the variance—covariance matrix from the demeaned regression. The
entire expression is easily computed using proc reg and proc matrix in SAS. Since
we suspected that error variances were different in different industry—occupation
cells we first estimated the regression to obtain estimates of the error variance
for each cell and then reestimated it using data where each observation is divided
by the square—root of the estimated cell error variance. The estimate of the
variance—covariance matrix for the m s can also be constructed using weighted
data.
The variance of the m's may then be constructed as in A3 above where Var(m) is
constructed as before and
(A7) 'c(e) =CXn1vm)/N (nijnkjvffuj,kj)/(
where vm1 is the diagonal element of (m) corresponding to the fixed effect
for industry i and occupation j, and vmk is the covariance term for the fixed
effects for occupation j for industries i and k.
AppendIx 1 A1—3When estimating the correlations of the industry fixed effects it is no longer
true that the estimated covariance of two occupation's fixed effects acrossin-
dustries is an unbiased, or even consistent, estimate of the covariances of the
true fixed effects since the regression procedure induces a correlationin the
measrement errors (e). A consistent estimate can be constructed as
(A8) cov(m'm'k) =cov(m,mk)—cov(eek)
where
(A9) ''(eek) =(Xvmk)/I —(ZZvm]k)/I2
is the estimated covariance of the jth and kth occupation fixed effect
for industries i and 1 from A6 and I is the number of industries. A consistent
estimate of the correlation of the true fixed effects can be obtained by dividing



















Trans. Equip. Oper. 804—828,833—834,844—859,876
Laborers 863—875,877-883,885,887—889
A2-1